‘We come before you, gallant guardians of the state, to plead a cause which is common to us all, and which it needs little short of unanimous resolution to defend… Since the death of the rebel usurpers, whose designs were inspired by rage and madness, the barbarians, as if to appease the unhallowed spirits with an offering of Roman blood, have disturbed the peace of our frontier and are ranging wantonly through Gaul, relying on the fact that harsh necessity requires our presence at the other end of the world…’[1]
Extract from Constantius’ address to assembled troops in AD 355 upon elevating Julian to the rank of Ceaser.
The Roman Empire can be seen as the apex of state formation and empire building in antiquity and its resilience is demonstrated by its longevity over almost a thousand years from 500BC.[2] The Roman state was sufficiently organised to remain stable, yet flexible enough to deal with both internal and external forces of change acting upon the empire.[3] From the 3rd century BC, the Roman Empire expanded into Western Europe leading to an increase in both the empire’s surface area and population, however after the 1st century AD, the empire’s expansion stalled.[4] After the conquest of Gaul in 20BC, the surface area of the empire consisted of 267,000km² and the early expansion of the empire stopped as it ceased to be affordable as the total costs of conquest reached a point of declining returns.[5] The Romans considered possessing an adequate material base and security as the essential requirements for an evolving civilisation, and providing this security had to fit within the constraints of its economic base and without compromising Rome’s political order.[6] Furthermore, the barbarian threat as stipulated by the extract from Constantius’ address was not thrust upon an unsuspecting empire, as Rome had centuries of experience dealing with barbarians.[7] The term ‘barbarian’ started as a Greek name to refer to all those who did not speak Greek, however this term evolved to transform all the neighbours of the Roman Empire into a collectivity from a Mediterranean perspective, however the populations bordering the empire had their own separate labels, customs, languages and traditions.[8] The Roman conquest of foreign lands led to the pacification and the integration of millions into a common civilisation whom looked to the emperor for protection and the Roman frontier served the purpose of keeping outsiders clear from the provinces.[9]
This dissertation will discuss whether the 4th century Alamanni as barbarian outsiders posed a greater threat to the Western Roman Empire, than their 1st century predecessors. The Alamanni could be found in the area of the upper and high Rhine, however the term ‘Alamanni’ was a Roman category, rather than an ethnicity which related to peoples occupying an area of land, as any of Elbe-Germani peoples who drifted westwards during the 3rd century became Alamanni in Alamannia, whereas those who drifted eastwards became Suebi in Suebia.[10] In the 3rd century, there was a chaotic breakdown of imperial defences which accompanied a period of severe internal strife and civil wars within the empire, as between the death of Septimius in 211, and the accession of Diocletian in 284, there were twenty-four emperors, alongside many usurpers.[11] In AD 259 the Iuthungi were able to invade Italy and the Alamanni invaded through the upper Rhine and through eastern and southern Gaul into the upper Po Valley.[12] Postumus usurped in AD 260 against Gallienus and successfully seized control over most of the Western Roman Empire and it was Postumus who made the decision to abandon the upper German/Raetian limes, which allowed for the Alamanni, who originally comprised of mixed bands of Elbgermanic raiders to settle on the former Roman territory east of the Rhine now categorised as Alamannia.[13] The situation was stabilised by emperor Diocletian who ruled from 284-305 and during his reign was able to restore political stability, territorial security and through implementing the joint rule of tetrarchy Diocletian attempted to prevent future civil wars which jeopardised the security of the empire.[14]
The threat that the Alamanni posed during the 4th century is considered by chapter seven in John Drinkwater’s book ‘The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis)’. In this chapter Drinkwater argues that the ‘Germanic threat’ was exploited by Julian in his efforts to build up his strength and military reputation to confront Constantius II, and it was this exploitation that prevented a peaceful resolution to the earlier Alamannic incursions which led to the subsequent battle of Strasbourg in AD 357.[15] Drinkwater used Julian’s writings and that of his supporters, especially Ammianus Marcellinus to argue that the Alamannic threat was overexaggerated and to support Drinkwater’s argument that the Alamanni were exploited by Julian to further his own ambition.[16] Firstly, Drinkwater argues that the Alamannic incursion and settlement in 356 alongside the Roman side of the Rhine was not an invasion as the Alamanni would likely have considered themselves as subjects as Rome.[17] Drinkwater makes this assertion based on the Roman acceptance of the Frankish settlement over the Rhine in Toxandria, and because the Alamanni would have been incapable of conquering Gaul, and any attempt to do would have been punished by Rome.[18] Drinkwater supposes that Constantius II granted permission for this settlement and that Julian’s 356 campaign against the Alamanni west of the Rhine was a practice of police work to reassert Roman control over the Rhine Valley but Constantius had no intention of expelling the settlers.[19] However, the toleration of the Alamannic settlement became a political embarrassment for Constantius, and Drinkwater argues that Julian’s 357 campaign was intended as a massive military show of strength to encourage a bloodless Alamannic withdrawal from the Rhine valley.[20] Yet through attacking and slaughtering the Alamanni who fled from the Rhine valley to the islands in the Rhine, Julian provoked a full-scale battle with the Alamanni which Constantius had actively tried to avoid.[21] Subsequently, Julian pressed his campaign against the Alamanni in Alamannia, east of the Rhine, which in turn forced the formation of a hostile alliance led by the Alamannic king Chnodomarius.[22] This Alamannic alliance confronted Julian at Strasbourg ordering Julian to depart from their territory, Julian’s subsequent refusal led to the battle of Strasbourg of 357, and despite being outnumbered Julian won an impressive victory.[23] Julian’s subsequent peace with the Alamanni was not the prize won from a superior opponent but rather an exploitation of their suffering to further Julian’s military and political reputation.[24] Therefore, through forcing the Alamanni to confront Julian at Strasbourg in 357, through Julian’s ethnic cleansing of the left bank of the Rhine, Julian was able to exploit the Alamanni for his own purposes, who otherwise posed no real threat and the subsequent campaigns of the 358 and 359 were intended to maintain the imagery of the Alamannic boogeymen.[25] Julian’s campaigns of 357, 358 and 359 beat the spirit out of the Alamanni, however after the area was sufficiently pacified both Julian and Constantius took careful measures to restore stability to the region and ensured that the policy of cooperation with the leading Alamanni resumed, which was intended to prevent widespread raiding across Rome’s frontier.[26]
In contrast Peter Heather contests many of the arguments made by Drinkwater in ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, however like Drinkwater, Heather utilises evidence from Ammianus Marcellinus, particularly Res Gestae, Julian’s Letter to the Athenians, and Libanius’ funeral oration for Julian.[27] Fundamentally, Peter Heather disagrees with Drinkwater’s argument that the Alamanni never posed any threat to the Roman Empire, which was inspired by revisionist accounts of the Cold War, as the Alamanni were a threat to provinces, tax revenues, agriculture and also risked increased costs for military expenditure.[28] Heather disagrees with Drinkwater that the Alamannic settlement west of the Rhine in the early 350s was licensed by Constantius, as this was only stated by Libanius and there are no clear implications in any of the other sources that the Alamanni were granted permission to settle, rather instead of granting the Alamanni permission to settle Constantius had to fight to regain control of the Rhine frontier.[29] Furthermore, in contrast to Drinkwater’s assertion, Heather argues that there was no division between Constantius and Julian regarding the policy towards the Alamannic settlement on the west bank of the Rhine and Heather demonstrates this by the fact that there was no change in imperial policy during the winter of 356/7 despite the change of command in Julian’s entourage.[30] Heather also disagrees with Drinkwater’s argument that the alliance which confronted Julian at Strasbourg in 357 was a spontaneous result of Julian’s attacks on the Alamannic settlements west of the Rhine, in July 357.[31] Since the battle of Strasbourg occurred in August 357, Heather argues that it is completely unconvincing that the battle was a spontaneous enterprise, as it would have required considerable political negotiation among the Alamanni as well as the Alamannic neighbours who were the likely suppliers of the mercenaries present at the battle.[32] Additionally, Heather outlines the logistical realities which further discredit Drinkwater’s argument that the forces collected at Strasbourg was a consequence of a spontaneous coalition, as pre-modern armies moved a maximum of 40 kilometres per day and the Alamannic forces at Strasbourg came from across the area east of the river Rhine which was over 300 kilometres long, from Mainz in the north to Augst in the south.[33] In addition to the considerable distance assembled forces would have needed to travel in around a month, the collection of food and weaponry which would have been needed prior to the battle further discredits Drinkwater’s claim that the forces amassed at Strasbourg were organised within a month in response to Julian’s attack on Alamannic settlements.[34] Rather Heather argues that is more likely that the alliance which confronted Julian at Strasbourg was organised over the winter and spring 356/7 in response to the first expulsion of Alamannic settlers west of the Rhine after the battle of Brumath in 356/7, and that the alliance was a deliberate mobilisation for a planned confrontation in 357.[35] Additionally, Heather argues that Constantius did not send Julian to Gaul to distance him from court, as a potential dynastic challenger, rather it was because Julian was the most politically attractive choice, as he was less able to usurp owing to Julian’s lack of support networks, however despite being the most politically attractive choice, Julian may not have been the most qualified for the role as he made several, and potentially lethal mistakes.[36] Yet despite Julian’s shortcomings, Heather argues that the victory at Strasbourg acted as a crucial catalyst for Julian’s success, owing to imperial ideology which grants legitimacy to rulers based on military success, as it indicated that the ruler was divinely supported, and therefore Strasbourg acted as turning point in Julian’s ambitions.[37] Heather agrees with Drinkwater than the Alamanni were not a mortal threat to the empire, and the annexation of an area around the size of the Netherlands was the maximum damage the Alamanni could inflict, however the Alamanni were able and willing to exploit Roman weakness and disunity.[38]
This dissertation will affirm an argument made by Drinkwater that the Alamannic population, which numbered around 120,000 was too small to completely conquer the Roman Empire considering that in the provinces neighbouring Alamannia, the combined population was around ten million[39] However, this dissertation will also align with the argument outlined by Heather that despite not being a mortal threat to the empire the Alamanni were still a threat.[40] Therefore, this dissertation will argue that the 4th century Alamanni posed a greater threat than their 1st century predecessors by a considerable extent. This argument will be developed through the following chapters on the 4th century Alamannic threat to the provinces, to individual emperors and usurpers, and the Roman military.
Threat to the provinces
‘…the Alamanni, invaded the whole of Gaul, and destroyed down to its very foundations every single which had been put up in ancient times.’[41]
Extract from Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks, which describes the Alamannic invasion of Gaul under the reign of Valerianus and Gallienus.
The provinces of the empire were the territories outside of Italy which were conquered by Rome and had administrative structures focused in the cities and were organised and governed with the primary aim of creating the optimum conditions for draining the provinces of as much wealth as possible.[42] However, during the 3rd century there was always at least one province that was either out of control or in revolt as a consequence of the turmoil created by the rapid succession of emperors.[43] Often during the 3rd century troops were removed from the frontier to fight in the private wars between usurpers and emperors.[44] It was during the turmoil of the 3rd century that the Alamanni as well as other barbarian groups were able to invade the Western Roman Empire[45] and the extract from Gregory of Tours highlights the destruction which the 3rd century Alamanni inflicted upon the province of Gaul.[46] Therefore, the case for considering the 4th century Alamanni a threat to the provinces of the Western Roman Empire is supported by the fact that they have an historic precedent for invading, causing destruction, and interfering with the maintenance of optimum conditions for wealth extraction. However, alongside the historic precedent of Alamannic invasions in the 3rd century, the 4th century Alamanni engaged in raiding against the provinces of the Western Roman Empire.
The Alamanni were inherently violent and the urge to raid was a prominent aspect of their society, and therefore the risk of raiding made the Alamanni a threat to the provinces.[47] This was likely caused by the chronic poverty of Alamannia which generated social tensions and in turn led to conflict amongst the Alamannic warriors, and conflict between the Alamanni and the Roman Empire.[48] The inclination for the Alamanni to raid the provinces of the Western Roman Empire was the result of the huge economic disparity between the provinces and the lands which lay beyond the empire’s frontier of the rivers Rhine and Danube.[49] This economic disparity is demonstrated by the fact that a wide range of Roman products were desirable for Alamannic raiders, for either direct use or for trading, alongside the more valuable objects of gold and silver.[50] The diversity amongst the objects stolen by Alamannic raiders is demonstrated by an excavation of loot, which was discovered in the Rhine and was likely sank after being ambushed by Roman river patrol vessels as the Alamanni fled after looting Roman villas.[51] The excavation demonstrated that nearly every single piece of Roman metal work was of interest and the loot stolen included 51 cauldrons, 25 bowls and basins and 20 iron ladles.[52] The wide diversity of items amongst the horded loot supports the assertion that the economy of Alamannia was much less developed than that of the neighbouring Roman provinces, and that the Alamanni were not great producers of manufactured items with settlers instead focusing on producing basic subsistence-goods, the diversity of the horde indicates that these items were not available to the Alamanni through domestic production but rather were made more readily available through raiding.[53]As a consequence of this huge disparity between the economic development of the provinces and the lands beyond the frontier of the Western Roman Empire and the subsequent incentive for the Alamanni to raid, Heather asserts that the Alamanni could not be left alone, rather they required proactive management, which turned the Alamanni into an effective client state of Rome.[54] However, it was not until the mid-350s that the Alamanni raided deeply into Gaul, and after the 3rd century crisis the Alamanni never raided deeply into Italy again.[55] Yet the perceived threat of the Alamanni persisted and under emperors Diocletian and Maximian a new defence and demarcation lines, which consisted of waterways and fortifications along the high Rhine, the Danube-Iller-Rhine lime.[56] This shows that the Western Roman Empire felt significantly threatened by the Alamanni enough to undergo the expense to construct fortifications despite the fact that the Alamanni were not raiding deeply into Gaul, and that the Alamanni never raided deeply into Italy again after the 3rd century crisis. In early 350 emperor Constans was deposed and killed in Gaul by a court conspiracy that resulted in Magnus Magnentius, a senior field officer, usurping to the throne of the Western Empire.[57] Constantius II, son of Constantine I and ruler of the Eastern Roman Empire, was unwilling to accept Magnentius as a co-ruler of the Roman Empire and waged war against him, and in 352 drove Magnentius out of Italy.[58] After being pushed out of Italy Magnentius fled to Gaul, and was eventually defeated at Lyon, where Magnentius committed suicide on the 10th August 353.[59] During this civil war the barbarians wreaked havoc upon the province of Gaul which involved both the Alamanni and the Franks, and the attacks upon Gaul persisted even after the death of Magnentius.[60] The distribution of coin-hoards suggest sporadic, but small-scale raiding over the entirety of the Rhine from 350/1 and there were larger scale but more localised raiding over the Rhine-knee in the area of modern-day Switzerland from 351/2.[61] By 352 these attacks spread down the Rhine affecting modern Palatinate and from 352/3 to 355, these attacks also affected the Mainz-Trier-Cologne region.[62] Therefore, it is overtly apparent that as a consequence of the vast economic disparity between the provinces and the lands beyond the Roman frontier, the Alamanni were inclined to raid the provinces and a civil war would have provided the optimum distraction for the Alamanni to exploit Roman weakness for short term gain, and this argument is supported by Heather who asserts that the Alamanni had the capacity to exploit Roman weakness, whilst remaining a non-existential threat to the empire.[63]
Ammianus Marcellinus supports the argument that the Alamanni had the capacity to exploit Roman weakness, who were still raiding Roman territory in 354, which suggests that the Alamanni still felt capable of exploiting Roman weakness even though the civil war ended in August 353 and Marcellinus describes the Alamanni raids as ‘devastating the frontier region of Gaul.’[64] Constantius moved against the Alamanni to confront the Alamannic kings and brothers, Gundomad and Vadomar in 354, who were conducting the raids on Gaul, however Constantius accepted their surrender without battle, who promised in return to assist the Romans and cease raiding the provinces, and Constantius secured a treaty from the Alamannic kings before departing.[65] This supports Heather’s assertion that the Alamanni needed management and that the lands beyond the frontier could not be left alone, and the securing of the treaty supports Heather’s assertion that Roman management turned the Alamannic kings into client rulers of the Roman Empire. However, the fact that Constantius moved against the Alamanni supports the argument that Alamannic raiding was threatening the provinces significantly enough to justify the costs of a military campaign against them. Particularly, the requirements for a campaign required significant organisation of grain supplies from other regions to feed the troops as the frontier regions did not produce enough grain alone and the limited timeframe for campaigning dictates that any campaign that did take place would likely need to be justifiable in terms of the threat posed to the empire.[66] Additionally, Constantius II returned to the high Rhine in 355 and declared war on two Alamannic communities, one is known to have been Lentienses and other is unknown, however both communities were know raiders of Roman territory.[67] This demonstrates that despite the Alamannic surrender and treaty of 354, Alamannic raiding remained a threat to the provinces, which further supports Heather’s assertion that the Alamanni required management. Finally, the brief usurpation of General Silvanus in Gaul in 355, which disrupted Roman military and civil administration on the Rhine, prompted raids by both the Alamanni and the Franks, despite the usurpation being cut short by the assassination of Silvanus by an agent of Constantius, the Alamanni were still willing and capable of exploiting Roman weakness through raiding Gaul, despite being recently defeated in 354.[68] Therefore, it is overtly apparent that the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to the provinces as a consequence of their raiding. The raiding was caused by the huge disparity between the economies of the Alamanni and the provinces and their perceived threat by Western Roman emperors persisted even though the Alamanni never raided deeply into Italy again after the 3rd century crisis. However, the Alamanni were willing and able to exploit Roman weakness through raiding deeply into Gaul in the 350s as a consequence of Magnentius’ usurpation and the continuation of raiding after the civil war ended shows the Alamanni still perceived the Western Roman Empire as being weakened. The campaigning by Constantius against the Alamanni in the 350s supports Heather’s assertion that the threat from Alamannic raiding required the proactive management of the Alamanni. However, subsequent raiding by the Alamanni in 355 as a consequence of Silvanus’ usurpation demonstrates that despite being recently defeated, the Alamanni remained a threat and were still willing to exploit Roman weakness through raiding the provinces. Despite the evident threat the 4th century Alamanni posed to the provinces of the Western Roman Empire through raiding, they also threatened the provinces through invasion.
In 356 Julian encountered Alamanni living in the territories of the cities in the valley of the Upper Rhine, and in 357 Julian encountered barbarians who had settled west of the Rhine, however this settlement occurred earlier between 352 and 355.[69] Drinkwater argues that this migration and settlement west of the Rhine was not an invasion but rather the Alamanni believed they were acting under the authority of Constantius II, and that this migration was viewed as a positive phenomenon, as it provided the Romans with child-producing subjects, which could provide future military recruits.[70] In contrast, Heather highlights how Drinkwater’s assertion is unconvincing, as the Roman Empire generally only made territorial concessions when it forced upon Rome either through direct conquest by an enemy, particularly Persia, or when holding onto a piece of territory was no longer viable after consideration was made to cost-benefit equations.[71] Furthermore, most regimes of the late Roman period were protective of their tax receipts and any concessions of territory would have immediately reduced the tax revenues and by 354 the Alamannic settlement had removed the tax revenues of seven city territories from imperial control.[72] In addition to the loss of tax revenue, by 355 in the Gallic interior and in an area three times as large as the territory occupied by the Alamanni, villa agriculture was no longer secure as it depended upon a secure frontier, as villas were rich targets for Alamannic raiders.[73] When the Romans did accept barbarian immigrants settling on Roman territory it was only on Roman terms, where the barbarians were under Roman dominance.[74] Rather the Alamannic occupation of the territory within the Rhine valley led to Constantius having to fight to get the territory of the Rhine valley back under control, and this is demonstrated by the military campaigns of 354-6, which pacified southern Alamannia and made it possible to strike north against the Alamannic settlement in the Rhine valley in 357, without the fear of being outflanked.[75] Therefore, the Alamannic occupation of territory within the Rhine valley was an invasion, rather than a migration which had the consent of Constantius II. The Alamannic occupation would have reduced the tax receipts and therefore it is unlikely that a late Roman regime would have willingly accepted the occupation, and the military activity which had to be undertook by the Roman Empire to regain control of the Rhine valley further demonstrates that the Alamannic settlement did not have the consent of Constantius II and was therefore an invasion. Alongside the fall in tax revenue, and loss of territory, this invasion threatened the provinces through making farming in the area surrounding the occupied territory less secure. Therefore, it is indubitable that the 4th century Alamanni threatened the provinces through invasion, which turn risked the tax receipts and farming within the provinces. However, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni posed a reduced threat to the provinces.
In contrast, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni posed a lesser threat by a significant extent, as by the end of the 1st century AD Germania was considered pacified, with inhabitants along the eastern side of the Rhine viewed as subservient to the empire despite not officially being under the empire’s administration.[76] This contrasts sharply to the 4th century Alamanni who were never fully pacified and from the 3rd century into the 4th century, the Alamanni were continually perceived as a threat to the provinces by the Western Roman Empire, which is demonstrated by the construction of defence and demarcation lines under emperors Diocletian and Maximian.[77] The fact that the Alamanni persisted as a threat from the 3rd century, into the 4th, marks a sharp distinction from their 1st century predecessors, some of whom became less of a threat as the 1st century progressed, for instance the Cherusci had once been a formidable tribe, and their chief Arminius led the revolt against Varus in AD 9, however by 84 the Chatti were able to successfully invade the neighbouring Cherusci as by 84 the Cherusci were a diminished force and vulnerable to invasion.[78] A further distinction between the 4th century Alamanni and their 1st century predecessors is demonstrated by Domitian who shortly after ascending to emperor scaled down operations in Britain to enable advances on the Rhine and Danube, and in AD 82 waged a campaign against the Chatti.[79] This campaign was successful and was of vital importance as it allowed for the strengthening of the defences of the middle Rhine, and allowed for the control of some of the main routes taken by tribes advancing on the Rhine from the north and east and by September 83, Domitian had conquered and pacified the Chatti.[80] Through pacifying the Chatti, Domitian would have alleviated the provinces of a threat whom William Beare described as the ‘Prussians of the ancient world’ and unlike other Germanic tribes the Chatti were better disciplined, equipped and supplied which allowed for the Chatti to wage campaigns rather than just mere battles.[81] Furthermore, after the reign of Domitian the actions against the Germani were confined to colonial policework, and this showed a wanning imperial interest and until the reign of Marcus Aurelius from 161-180, there was an end to imperial campaigns over the Rhine and upper Danube frontier, which demonstrates that the perceived threat from the Germani had diminished.[82] This contrasts starkly with the 4th century Alamanni whom despite being the target of six campaigns fought by Julian on the frontiers of Gaul between 356 and 361, and despite the heavy defeat inflicted upon the Alamanni at the battle of Strasbourg in 357[83], the Alamanni continued to be a threat and required military action up until 392, where Eugenius went to the Rhine to force the kings of the Alamanni and Franks into submission before moving his forces elsewhere.[84] This demonstrates that unlike their 1st century predecessors, the 4th century Alamanni were never fully pacified, and therefore continued to threaten the provinces. Furthermore, as a consequence of Domitian’s war on the Chatti the frontier of the Roman Empire was extended by 120 miles, and occupied the territory of the Cubii, which is thought to have been located beyond the Mattiaci, and led to Domitian adopting the victory name Germanicus.[85] This directly contrasts with the 4th century Alamanni, as the Alamannic occupation of the Rhine valley led to a temporary reduction in Roman controlled territory rather than the expansion of Roman territory at the expense of the Chatti which was undertaken by Domitian in the 1st century. Therefore, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni were less of a threat to the provinces, as they did not invade and occupy Roman territory, rather the barbarians, particularly the Chatti, lost territory to Roman expansion.
In summary, it is indubitable that the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to the provinces by a significant extent and this is demonstrated by their threat to the provinces through raiding and invasion. The Alamannic raiding was a consequence of the huge disparity between the economies of Alamannia and the Western Roman provinces, and the Alamanni were willing and able to exploit Roman weakness, which is demonstrated by their raiding in Gaul during the usurpation of Magnentius in the 350s. Furthermore, the campaigning by Constantius against the Alamanni in the 350s supports Heather’s assertion that the threat from Alamannic raiding was so significant that it required proactive management, however subsequent raiding by the Alamanni in 355 shows that despite being recently defeated the Alamanni were still capable and willing to exploit perceived Roman weakness through raiding the provinces. Additionally, the Alamannic invasion and settlement of territory within the Rhine valley reduced the tax revenue and alongside the direct loss of territory, the invasion threatened farming in area surrounding the Alamannic settlement. The significant threat posed by the 4th century Alamanni to the Roman provinces is contrasted strongly by their 1st century predecessors who posed a significantly reduced threat to the provinces, and this is demonstrated this is because the Alamanni, unlike their 1st century predecessors were never fully pacified, and despite suffering several campaigns against them in the mid-4th century, and a major defeat at Strasbourg, the Alamanni remained a threat to the provinces throughout the 4th century. In contrast, the war against the Chatti by Domitian led to their pacification, and the pacification of the Chatti would have alleviated some of threat endured by the provinces, as the Chatti were better equipped to attack the provinces than other Germani, and unlike the 4th century Alamanni, some of their 1st century predecessors became weaker as the century progressed. Finally, the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to the provinces than their 1st century predecessors by a significant extent because the Alamanni were able to temporarily invade and settle on Roman territory, which is contrasting the situation in the 1st century, whereby Roman controlled territory expanded at the expense of barbarian tribes. Therefore, the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to the provinces as a consequence of their raiding and invasion of Roman territory, and the threat they posed to the provinces was significantly more than their 1st century predecessors. However, the 4th century Alamanni were also a considerable threat to Western Roman emperors and usurpers and were more dangerous than their 1st century predecessors by a significant extent.
Threat to individual emperors/usurpers
‘…Constantius was disturbed by frequent messages about the desperate state of Gaul, which barbarians were reducing to utter destruction unopposed. After long internal debate on how best to repel these troubles while he himself remained in Italy, which he wished to do so because he thought dangerous to remove to a distant region… resolved to associate himself in the imperial power his cousin Julian, whom he had recently sent from Achaea…’[86]
Extract from Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), which describes Constantius rational for dispatching Julian to Gaul.
The 4th century Alamanni were a clear threat to the individual Western Roman emperors and usurpers, and the extract from Ammianus Marcellinus demonstrates that the 4th century Alamanni were perceived as threat to the safety of individual emperors, which is used as justification by Marcellinus for Constantius’ decision to dispatch Julian to Gaul. Subsequently, Julian campaigns in Gaul against the Alamanni, and other Germani formed part of Constantius II’s response to the deteriorating security situation on the Rhine frontier after the failure of Magnentius’ usurpation which ended in August 353.[87] The personal threat faced by emperors whilst campaigning is further demonstrated by Constantius I, who was suddenly overwhelmed when campaigning near Langres by barbarians, whom Eutropius identifies as the Alamanni.[88] Subsequently, Constantius I was forced to seek refuge within the city of Langres, however, the gates were closes which resulted in Constantius being hauled over the city walls by a rope, and was rescued by the arrival of a Roman army.[89] This event demonstrates that the Alamanni could threaten the personal safety of emperors, and evidence from Marcellinus highlights how emperors also perceived the Alamanni as a threat to their personal safety on campaign, which was used as justification for dispatching Julian to regain control of the Rhine frontier. Therefore, the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to personal safety of Western Roman emperors when campaigning.
In addition, the 4th century Alamanni posed an indirect threat to Western Roman emperors through creating the conditions for usurpations. Particularly, the six campaigns fought by Julian on the frontiers of Gaul between 356 and 361 overturned the relationship between himself and his superior Augustus Constantine II.[90] In 357 Julian won a significant victory against the Alamanni at Strasbourg, it ignited Julian’s ambition for the imperial throne and was crucial for his success in usurping Constantius II.[91] Roman ideology claimed that the emperor was chosen and supported by the divine, and victory on the battlefield was the ultimate proof of legitimacy.[92] However, defeat in battle indicates that the divinity was withholding support of the incumbent emperor, which under Roman ideology could only occur if the incumbent ruler was illegitimate.[93] Considering this ideology which relies on military victory as an indication of legitimacy, Julian’s significant victory over the Alamanni indicated that he was divinely supported and therefore the legitimate ruler to the Western Roman Empie.[94] This is supported by Marcellinus who describes the cause of victory as ‘…when the favour of heaven had brought the battle to this successful end…’ and describes Julian as someone ‘…who had shown himself a man whose merits were above his position, and whose authority was based more on his deserts than on his rank, was now hailed as Augustus by the unanimous voice of the whole army.’[95] This demonstrates the Roman ideological belief that the victory was gained through divine favour and Marcellinus portrays this victory as evidence that Julian’s authority is supported by the divine, and suggests that Julian should be Augustus which is a belief that was supposedly echoed by Julian’s soldiers. Julian exploited the Alamanni through waging several campaigns against them in order to build a political and military reputation which Julian later used to claim the title of Augustus in 360.[96] Subsequently, both Julian and Constantius II prepared for a confrontation, and in the spring of 361 Julian left Gaul to secure the imperial throne, however by October or November 361, Constantius died unexpectedly which allowed Julian to secure the throne of the Western Roman Empire without a fight.[97] Therefore, it is overtly apparent that the 4th century Alamanni posed an indirect threat to Constantius II as Julian exploited the Alamanni to build a military and political reputation to claim the title of Augustus, which was a direct threat to Constantius’ reign and this exploitation of the Alamanni was able to occur as a consequence of Roman ideology which bestowed legitimacy upon those who were militarily successful.
Additionally, the 4th century Alamanni also posed a threat to usurpers, and this is demonstrated by the civil war which erupted after Constans was killed and deposed in Gaul by a court conspiracy in early 350.[98] This conspiracy put Magnus Magnentius on the western throne who moved into Italy, however Constantius II, ruler of the Eastern Roman Empire refused to recognised Magnentius’ reign and moved against him forcing Magnentius out of Italy in 352.[99] Subsequently, fled to Gaul where on the 10th August 353 Magnentius was defeated at Lyon by Constantius, after which Magnentius committed suicide.[100] During this civil war the Germanic barbarians, which included the Alamanni wreaked havoc amongst Gaul, which began at the start of Magnentius’ usurpation and continued after Magnentius’ fall.[101] Drinkwater and Heather both agree that it is possible that Constantius II used the Alamanni to attack Magnentius’ regime in Gaul, as having forced Magnentius out of Illyricum after being defeated at the battle Mursa in 351, Constantius could have contacted the Alamannic leaders between the Rhine and Danube and paid them to attack Gaul.[102] This claim is supported by strong evidence that every emperor used the militaries of barbarians to fight in civil and foreign wars when possible, despite the fact that the use of barbarians was considered a negative trait and something which was only undertaken by defeated usurpers as the use of barbarian militaries was considered further evidence that the defeated usurper was not favoured by the divine.[103] The Alamannic attacks on Magnentius’ regime weakened his defence of Italy from Constantius’ invasion from the east and the Alamannic attacks would have been focused on the Belfort Gap or the central Swiss Plateau in Gaul, which threatened Magnentius’ rear and also prevented Ceasar Decentius from supporting Magnentius’ defence of Italy.[104] In the final part of Magnentius’ reign the Alamanni of the upper Rhine also caused trouble for Decentius.[105] Therefore, it is overtly apparent that the Alamanni contributed to the defeat of Magnentius through weakening his regime and his defence of Italy, which contributed to Magnentius’ defeat and suicide and Lyon, which makes the 4th century Alamanni a clear threat to usurpers. This conclusion is further supported by a case study by Drinkwater which shows the use of an Alamannic leader, King Crocus who put himself and his warriors at the service of Constantius I, and managed to climb to a position of great influence at the imperial court at the time of Constantius’ death in York on the 25th July 306.[106] In defiance of the Tetrarchy Crocus supported Constantine I, the eldest son of Constantius I, to assume the western imperial throne, which was the first but not the last time that a barbarian general played a key role in the proclamation of a new emperor.[107] This case study supports the assertion that the Alamanni could be involved in the internal succession disputes of the Roman empire, and if Alamannic leaders were capable of supporting successful usurpers to defy the tetrarchy, then it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Alamanni could be used against other usurpers, thus supporting the argument that the 4th century Alamanni could be a threat to usurpers.
In contrast, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni posed a significantly reduced threat to emperors and usurpers. The 1st century Germani served as the elite bodyguard to Ceasar, Pompey and their successors until the Batavian rebellion in AD 69 and Germania more than any other region in the empire was the centre for imperial victories as the personal battleground of emperors.[108] This is demonstrated by role that the campaigns against the Chatti and the Germanic Marcomanni in AD 83, and the campaign against the Quadi in 89 had in contributing to the shaping of Domitian’s public image and was vital in Domitian’s claim to military glory.[109] Therefore, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni were less of a threat to the personal safety of emperors as they served in the elite imperial bodyguard and Germania itself was a political tool for Roman emperors, which was exploited to bolster their military reputations, which was a necessity in Roman ideology to signify that the ruler had divine support, and was therefore the legitimate ruler.[110] The exploitation of the 1st century Germani for building a public image and military reputation is demonstrated by a Roman imperial cuirassed torso held in Princton University’s Art Museum, and the decoration on the torso appears to be a portrait of Domitian in full military costume.[111] An examination of the iconography of the torso supports the conclusion that the torso is a celebration of the successful conclusion of Domitian’s campaign against the Chatti in 83, which was personally led by Domitian.[112] The statute was commissioned shortly after the completion of the Chatti campaign and represents Domitian as Germanicus, conqueror of Germany.[113] Therefore, it is overtly apparent that the statute represents a celebration of Domitian’s exploitation of the Germani for building a public image and military reputation, which supports the claim that the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni were less of a threat, as they were mere sources exploitation by Roman emperors rather than a threat. The exploitation of 1st century Germani is also evidenced by Gaius, who after ascending to the imperial throne in 37, campaigned over the Rhine in 40 to secure a reputation of military success and to distance himself from the political troubles in Rome.[114] This further supports the argument that the 1st century predecessors were no threat to Roman emperors or usurpers but rather a source for building a military reputation and a tool for escaping political difficulties. Finally, during the 1st century Tacitus portrays the lands in Germania as being free from the influence and knowledge of Roman emperors, as they were geographically isolated from the empire by the rivers Rhine and Danube and this geographical isolation freed the 1st century Germani from imperial control and the hierarchical networks of patronage and dependence.[115] Therefore, the 1st century predecessors to the Alamanni posed little threat to potential usurpers in the Roman empire as a consequence of their geography which freed them from Roman influence, control and knowledge.
In summary, the 4th century Alamanni have been proven to be a threat to the personal safety of emperors, an indirect threat to emperors through the creation of conditions ripe for usurpations and a threat to usurpers. The threat the Alamanni posed to the personal safety of emperors is demonstrated by an extract from Marcellinus which details that Constantius II perceived the Alamanni to be a such threat that it prevented Constantius from attending Gaul in person to confront the Alamanni. Additionally, the event of the Alamanni overwhelming Constantius I and forcing the emperor to seek refuge in the city of Langres is further evidence of the 4th century Alamanni posing a threat to the personal safety of emperors on campaigns. Furthermore, the 4th century Alamanni posed an indirect threat to emperors through the creation of conditions which were ripe for usurpations, particularly the exploitation of the Alamanni by Julian to build a political and military reputation in the 350s allowed for Julian to claim the title of Augustus which was a direct challenge to Constantius II’ reign, and Julian’s exploitation was able to occur as a consequence of Roman ideology which bestowed legitimacy upon those who were militarily successful. The threat that the 4th century Alamanni posed to usurpers is demonstrated by the contribution that the Alamanni made to the defeat of Magnentius through weakening his regime and his defence of Italy, and threat that the Alamanni posed to usurpers is further supported by the case study of the Alamannic King Crocus who was able to exert considerable influence at court to support the claim of Constantius I in defiance of the triarchy. In contrast, the 1st century predecessor to the 4th century Alamanni posed a considerably reduced threat to emperors and usurpers. Until 69 the Germani served as the elite imperial bodyguard to emperors, and Germania itself was a political tool for Roman emperors, which was exploited to bolster their military reputations or to distance themselves from political troubles in Rome. This directly contrasts to the 4th century Alamanni who were able to pose such a threat that they deterred Constantius II from attending in person to the defence of Gaul, and who were exploited by Julian, rather than Constantius II, to formulate a military and political reputation necessary for usurpation. Finally, the 1st century Germani posed little threat to potential usurpers in the Roman empire as their geographical isolation freed them Roman influence, control or knowledge which was a complete contrast to the situation in the 350s where the Alamanni played a role in defeating Magnentius at the behest of Constantius II. Therefore, the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to emperors and usurpers by a strong extent in comparison to their 1st century predecessors. However, in addition to the increased threat posed to the provinces, emperors and usurpers, the 4th century Alamanni also posed a greater threat to the Roman military than the 1st century Germani.
Threat to the Roman military
‘All of these warlike and savage tribes were led by Chnodomar and Serapio, whose power exceeded that of the other kings…These two were followed by the next most powerful kings, five in number, by ten princes and a long train of nobles, and by an army of 35,000 men drawn from various peoples, some of whom served as mercenaries and the rest in accordance with pacts of mutual assistance.’[116]
Extract Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), which describes the forces amassed against the Romans at Strasbourg.
The 4th century Alamanni posed a greater threat to the Roman military than the 1st century Germani by a great extent, and this is demonstrated by the assembled Alamannic army which confronted Julian at Strasbourg in 357 as described in the extract from Marcellinus, which was gathered in response to the expulsion of the Alamanni who settled west of the Rhine, and Julian’s attack upon the Alamanni who fled.[117] Evidence for Marcellinus shows the Alamannic kings, Chnodomar, Vestralp, Urius, Ursicinus, Serapio, Suomar, and Hortar gathered their strength and advanced towards Strasbourg after a Roman deserter informed the Alamannic kings that Julian was left with only 13,000 troops.[118] Therefore, according to Marcellinus the Alamannic army vastly outnumbered Julian’s and this is evidence that the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to the Roman military as they were capable of fielding armies capable of defeating Roman forces through being superior in number. However, despite being outnumbered Julian won a significant victory against the Alamanni and according to Marcellinus the Alamanni suffered 6000 casualties compared to only 250 Roman casualties from Julian’s army.[119] Additionally, Chnodomarius the most important of the seven Alamannic kings gathered at Strasbourg was captured along with his retinue.[120] Furthermore, Drinkwater argues that the size of the Alamannic army confronting Julian’s forces only consisted of around 15,000 warriors, however even if Drinkwater’s revised figure for the size of the Alamannic forces is correct, it still demonstrates that the Alamanni were a threat to the Roman military through being able to field a larger army.[121] Therefore, despite being defeated, having a key leader captured and the size of the Alamannic forces being revised the 4th century Alamanni were still a threat to the Roman military, and this is demonstrated by the forces assembled at Strasbourg as the Alamanni were capable of fielding a larger army. Furthermore, the alliance between the Alamannic kings was most likely formed in the winter and spring of 356/7 in response to the first expulsion of Alamannic settlers west of the Rhine, after the battle of Brumath in 356, and that the forces assembled at Strasbourg was a planned showdown with the Roman army, and this contrasts with Drinkwater’s argument that the alliance was a spontaneous coalition.[122] Therefore, considering the Alamannic forces assembled at Strasbourg was part of a planned showdown with Rome, the threat they posed to the Roman military is enhanced as it suggests the Alamanni were confident in their ability in being able to defeat Julian’s army, otherwise they would not have amassed their forces for a planned confrontation, and that the Alamanni were capable of formulating and conducting long term military plans to challenge Roman military power. Therefore, it is overtly evident that the 4th century Alamanni were a threat to the Roman military at Strasbourg, as despite losing the battle, the Alamanni were capable of fielding a larger army, and being able to formulate and conduct long term military plans to challenge Roman power.
In contrast, the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni posed a significantly reduced threat to the Roman military. Until AD 200 Rome was able to keep the barbarians outside its frontiers at bay, however despite Rome’s early success at keeping the barbarians at bay every century of Roman history witnessed a military disaster at the hands of the barbarians.[123] For instance in AD 9 Quintilius Varus and his three legions were heavily defeated by the Cherusci who were led by Arminius, however despite the occasional setback the 1st century Germani were less of a threat to the Roman military as Tacitus highlights the lack of unity amongst these tribes as they were fighting constantly fighting amongst themselves.[124] Furthermore, Drinkwater further downplays the significance of the Varus disaster through associating it with Roman incompetence rather than Germanic aggression.[125] This contrasts heavily with the 4th century Alamanni who in 357 assembled a grand alliance to confront the Roman army at Strasbourg and showed considerable solidarity with the Alamanni who were expelled by Julian after settling west of the Rhine in the 350s.[126] In addition to the lack of unity amongst the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni, the confederations amongst the 1st century Germani were much weaker than the 4th century Alamannic confederation present at Strasbourg.[127] In the 1st century the cross tribal confederations were either longer lived and primarily religious in nature or were political but short lived.[128] The religious confederations never acted as a military response to outside intrusion and the political confederations of the 1st century which resisted Roman pressure were organised around dominant individuals, such as Arminius, however in every instance these confederations fell apart with the defeat of their leaders.[129] This contrasts heavily with the Alamannic confederation at Strasbourg which despite being heavily defeated and the leader of the confederation being captured, the alliance which itself survived and within a decade a new leader emerged, Vadomarius who was later assassinated by the Romans, however the Romans were later forced to recognise the status and position of another leader, Macrianus.[130] This demonstrates that the 4th century confederations had a much broader political identity, and unlike their 1st century predecessors, the Alamannic confederation was not dependent upon the success of its leader.[131] Therefore, it is evident that the lack of unity amongst the 1st century Germani and lack of longevity amongst their confederations makes the threat posed to the Roman military by the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni greatly reduced. The 4th century Alamanni in contrast were able to field larger armies than the Romans and were able to formulate and conduct long term plans to challenge Roman power, and therefore the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to the Roman military by a significant extent.
Conclusion
In summary, when considering the threat posed to the provinces, the threat to individual emperors and usurpers, and the threat posed to the Roman military, it is apparent that the 4th century Alamanni posed a significantly greater threat than their 1st century predecessors. The 4th century Alamanni posed a threat to the provinces a by a significant extent through raiding and invasion, which required proactive management. In contrast the 1st predecessors to the Alamanni posed a significantly reduced threat and this is demonstrated by the fact that they were pacified, which contrasts with the Alamanni who were never fully pacified, despite suffering several campaigns against them in the mid-4th century. Furthermore, the Alamanni were able to invade and settle on Roman territory which contrasts to the situation in the 1st century where the Roman frontier was expanded at the expense of barbarian territory under the reign of Domitian. Therefore, it is evident that the Alamanni were a greater threat to the provinces by a strong extent in comparison to their 1st century predecessors through raiding and invasion. Additionally, the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to emperors and usurpers by a strong extent in comparison to their 1st century predecessors and this is demonstrated by the threat posed to the personal safety of emperors, the indirect threat caused by the creation of conditions which allowed for usurpations and the threat to usurpers. In contrast, the 1st century Germani posed a considerably reduced threat to emperors and usurpers as the Germani served as the elite imperial bodyguard to emperors until AD 69 and Germania itself was a political tool for Roman emperors which was exploited to bolster their reputations or to distance themselves from political trouble in Rome. This directly contrasts to the 4th century Alamanni who were able to pose such a threat that they deterred Constantius II from attending in person to the defence of Gaul, and who were exploited by Julian, rather than Constantius II, to formulate a military and political reputation necessary for usurpation. The 1st century Germani also posed little threat to potential usurpers in the Roman empire as their geographical isolation freed them Roman influence, control or knowledge, which was a complete contrast to the situation in the 350s where the Alamanni played a role in defeating Magnentius at the behest of Constantius II. Therefore, the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to emperors and usurpers by a strong extent in comparison to their 1st century predecessors. Finally, the 4th century Alamanni posed a greater threat to the Roman military than the 1st century Germani by a great extent, and this is demonstrated by the assembled Alamannic army which confronted Julian at Strasbourg in 357, despite losing the battle the Alamanni were capable of fielding a larger army, and being able to formulate and conduct long term military plans to challenge Roman power. In contrast, the lack of unity amongst the 1st century Germani and lack of longevity amongst their confederations makes the threat posed to the Roman military by the 1st century predecessors to the 4th century Alamanni greatly reduced. Thus the 4th century Alamanni were a greater threat to the Roman military than their 1st century predecessors as they were capable of fielding a larger army than the Romans at Strasbourg, conduct long term military planning to challenge Roman power and unlike the 1st century Germani, the Alamannic confederation had greater unity and longevity which was able to survive military defeat. Overall, when considering the threat posed to the provinces, the threat to individual emperors and usurpers, and the threat posed to the Roman military, it is overtly evident that the 4th century Alamanni posed a significantly greater threat than their 1st century predecessors.
Primary Sources
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Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks (London, 1974).
Heather, Peter, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (2012), pp. 69.
Marcellinus, Ammianus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378) (London, 1986).
Secondary Literature
Beare, William, ‘Tacitus on the Germans’, Greece & Rome, 11, No. 1 (1964), pp. 64–76.
Drinkwater, John, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis) (Oxford, 2007).
Drinkwater, John, ‘King of the Alamanni’, Britannia, 40 (2009), pp. 185-196.
Gergel, Richard, ‘An Allegory of Imperial Victory on a Cuirassed Statue of Domitian’, Record of the Art Museum, Princeton University, 45, No. 1 (1986), pp. 2-15.
Goffart, Walter, ‘Rome, Constantinople, and the Barbarians’, The American Historical Review, 86, No. 2 (1981), pp. 275-306.
Heather, Peter, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, in Hans-Ulrich Wiemer and Stefan Rebenich (eds.), A Companion to Julian the Apostate (2020), pp. 64-96.
Heather, Peter, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (2012).
Jones, Brian, ‘The Dating of Domitian’s War against the Chatti’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 22, No. 1 (1973), pp. 79-90.
Jones, Brian, ‘Domitian’s Advance into Germany and Moesia’, Latomus, 41, No. 2 (1982), pp. 329-335.
Leeuw, Van der, and de Vries, Bert, ‘Empire: The Romans in the Mediterranean’, in Johan Goudsblom and Bert de Vries (eds.), Mappae Mundi: Humans and Their Habitats in a Long-Term Socio-Ecological Perspective (2002), pp. 209-256.
Luttwak, Edward, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third (2016).
Smith, Ian, ‘A Chronology for Agricola, Mons Graupius and Domitian’s Triumph in the Chattan War’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 64, No. 2 (2015), pp. 156-204.
Tan, Zoë, ‘Subversive Geography in Tacitus’ Germania’, The Journal of Roman Studies, 104 (2014), pp. 181-204.
[1]Ammianus Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378) (London, 1986), pp. 81.
[2]Van der Leeuw and Bert de Vries, ‘Empire: The Romans in the Mediterranean’, in Johan Goudsblom and Bert de Vries (eds.), Mappae Mundi: Humans and Their Habitats in a Long-Term Socio-Ecological Perspective (2002), pp. 209, 210.
[3]Ibid. 210, 211.
[4]Ibid. 211.
[5]Ibid. 251.
[6]Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third (2016), Introduction.
[7]Walter Goffart, ‘Rome, Constantinople, and the Barbarians’, The American Historical Review, 86, No. 2 (1981), pp. 276.
[8]Ibid. 277, 278.
[9]Ibid. 280.
[10]John Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis) (Oxford, 2007), Ch. 2.
[11]Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third, Ch. 3.
[12]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 2.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third, Ch. 3.
[15]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid.
[20]Ibid.
[21]Ibid.
[22]Ibid.
[23]Ibid.
[24]Ibid.
[25]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Peter Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, in Hans-Ulrich Wiemer and Stefan Rebenich (eds.), A Companion to Julian the Apostate (2020), pp. 64, 71.
[28]Ibid. 77.
[29]Ibid. 73.
[30]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 75.
[31]Ibid. 78.
[32]Ibid.
[33]Ibid.
[34]Ibid.
[35]Ibid.
[36]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 80.
[37]Ibid. 82.
[38]Ibid. 79.
[39]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Introduction, Ch. 4.
[40]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 79.
[41]Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks (London, 1974), pp. 89.
[42]Leeuw and Vries, ‘Empire: The Romans in the Mediterranean’, pp. 216.
[43]Ibid. 249.
[44]Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third, Ch. 3.
[45]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 2.
[46]Gregory of Tours, The History of the Franks (London, 1974), pp. 89.
[47]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 4.
[48]Ibid.
[49]Peter Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (2012), Ch. 2.
[50]Ibid.
[51]Found in Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe, pp. 69.
[52]Found in Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe, pp. 69.
[53]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 3.
[54]Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe, Ch. 2.
[55]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[56]Ibid.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[59]Ibid.
[60]Ibid.
[61]Ibid.
[62]Ibid.
[63]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 78.
[64]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378) (London, 1986), pp. 55.
[65]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), Book 14, No. 10.
[66]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 65, 66.
[67]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[68]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[69]Ibid. Ch. 7.
[70]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[71]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 74.
[72]Ibid. 74, 77.
[73]Ibid. 74, 77.
[74]Ibid. 74, 77.
[75]Ibid. 74, 76.
[76]Zoë Tan, ‘Subversive Geography in Tacitus’ Germania’, The Journal of Roman Studies, 104 (2014), pp. 200.
[77]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[78]Brian Jones, ‘The Dating of Domitian’s War against the Chatti’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 22, No. 1 (1973), pp. 86.
[79]Brian Jones, ‘Domitian’s Advance into Germany and Moesia’, Latomus, 41, No. 2 (1982), pp. 335.
[80]Jones, ‘The Dating of Domitian’s War against the Chatti’, pp. 79, 85.
[81]William Beare, ‘Tacitus on the Germans’, Greece & Rome, 11, No. 1 (1964), pp. 72.
[82]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Prelude.
[83]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 64, 68.
[84]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch 8.
[85]Ian Smith, ‘A Chronology for Agricola, Mons Graupius and Domitian’s Triumph in the Chattan War’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 64, No. 2 (2015), pp. 157, 161.
[86]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), pp. 80.
[87]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 65.
[88]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[89]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[90]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 64.
[91]Ibid. 68, 84.
[92]Ibid. 81.
[93]Ibid. 82.
[94]Ibid. 83.
[95]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), pp. 115.
[96]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[97]Ibid. Ch. 7, 8.
[98]Ibid. Ch. 6.
[99]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[100]Ibid.
[101]Ibid.
[102]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 78.
[103]Ibid. 73.
[104]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 6.
[105]Ibid.
[106]John Drinkwater, ‘King of the Alamanni’, Britannia, 40 (2009), pp. 185.
[107]Ibid. 185, 186, 194.
[108]Tan, ‘Subversive Geography in Tacitus’ Germania’, pp. 183.
[109]Ibid. 200.
[110]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 81.
[111]Found in Richard Gergel, ‘An Allegory of Imperial Victory on a Cuirassed Statue of Domitian’, Record of the Art Museum, Princeton University, 45, No. 1 (1986), pp. 3.
[112]Gergel, ‘An Allegory of Imperial Victory on a Cuirassed Statue of Domitian’, pp. 3.
[113]Ibid. 14.
[114]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Prelude.
[115]Tan, ‘Subversive Geography in Tacitus’ Germania’, pp. 182, 201.
[116]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), pp. 109.
[117]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 68.
[118]Marcellinus, The Later Roman Empire (AD 354-378), Book 16, No. 12.
[119]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 68.
[120]Ibid.
[121]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Ch. 7.
[122]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp 78.
[123]Goffart, ‘Rome, Constantinople, and the Barbarians’, pp. 281, 284, 285.
[124]Beare, ‘Tacitus on the Germans’, pp. 64, 74
[125]Drinkwater, The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: (Caracalla to Clovis), Prelude.
[126]Heather, ‘The Gallic Wars of Julian Caesar’, pp. 68.
[127]Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe, Ch. 2.
[128]Ibid.
[129]Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe, Ch. 2.
[130]Ibid.
[131]Ibid.
